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Abstract
This paper investigates the channels through which colonial origin a⁄ects eco-
nomic outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It focuses on four key channels of
transmission namely, human capital, trade openness, market distortion and selec-
tion bias. In contrast with previous studies where only initial conditions at inde-
pendence were held to in￿ uence the subsequent growth path, the methodology that
we apply in this paper combines (1) the pre-colonisation initial conditions, (2) the
initial conditions at independence and (3) the subsequent post-colonial changes in
explaining income di⁄erences amongst former SSA colonies. Our sample comprises
of 38 SSA countries studied over the period 1960-2000, and we use pooled OLS and
Hausman-Taylor estimation techniques in a panel framework. The results suggest
that former British colonies have had marginally higher income levels than former
French colonies, and this is attributable to the legacy of British colonisation in trade
openness and human capital. We do not ￿nd robust evidence in support of the mar-
ket distortion and selection bias channels. Besides highlighting the importance of
the trade openness channel, the study is also the ￿rst, to the best of our knowl-
edge, to simultaneously examine a range of feasible transmission channels between
colonial origin and economic growth performance.
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11 Introduction
Over the past decades, a substantial volume of literature has dwelled on the subject of
colonisation and economic performance of former colonies. Economists became interested
in colonial legacies in their search for the reasons why some countries have grown relatively
slower than others. Notably, recent cross-country empirical evidence suggests that the
identity of the colonising power (or colonial origin) might help explain the observed growth
di⁄erential amongst former colonies around the world.1 In particular, it is claimed that, on
average, former British colonies have grown faster than former French colonies, although
much controversy still surrounds the likely mechanisms of transmission of any such colonial
legacy.
For instance, some economists have attempted to establish a causal relationship be-
tween one aspect of colonial legacy - the coloniser￿ s legal tradition (or legal origin) and a
broad range of variables that are important for economic growth.2 A key feature in many
of these empirical studies is that, when regional dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America are introduced in the regressions3 or when other aspects of colonial policy such
as human and physical capital indicators at the end of colonial rule are controlled for,4
the coe¢ cient of the legal origin dummy generally tends to diminish in magnitude and
signi￿cance. Interestingly also, when one considers only the sub-Saharan African (hence-
forth, SSA) dataset, the internationally observed growth di⁄erential between Common
Law and Civil Law countries disappears.
Furthermore, most of these empirical studies have fallen short of establishing a direct
impact of legal origin on economic growth. In their recent ￿ndings, Acemoglu & Johnson
(2005) and Klerman et al (2008) have concluded that legal origin cannot explain economic
growth performance. Roe & Siegel (2009), also present a range of conceptual and factual
evidence in support of why the legal origins explanations are ￿ awed.
1See for instance, the works by Klerman et al (2008), Rostowski & Stacescu (2006), Bertocchi &
Canova (2002), and Grier (1999).
2These cross-country studies show that countries that followed the English Common Law legal tra-
dition (henceforth referred to as Common Law countries) by colonisation or conquest, have on average
grown faster than countries that followed the Civil Law tradition (henceforth, Civil Law countries), specif-
ically, the French Civil Law countries. The protagonists of this debate are Raphael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny - henceforth LLSV (1997, 1998, 1999) & LLS (2008).
See also Levine et al (2000, 2002).
3Mahoney (2001:517) reports a drop in the coe¢ cient of the Common Law dummy from 0.714 (sig-
ni￿cant at the 1% level) to 0.561(signi￿cant at the 5% level) when dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America are introduced in the regressions. It is equally important to note that, the dummies for
these two regions are each highly statistically and economically signi￿cant.
4See Grier (1999), Bertocchi & Canova (2002) and Klerman et al (2008).
2Even supposing that the evidence on legal origins is robust, as Klerman et al (2008)
have argued, it will still be di¢ cult to attribute the di⁄erences in economic performance
between Common Law and Civil Law countries uniquely to legal origin (or law) because
other aspects of colonial policy such as education, trade, exchange regimes, ￿scal and
monetary policies or the style of local governance might also matter. Against this back-
drop, the present study seeks to investigate the channels through which colonial origin
a⁄ects income, using SSA as a case study. But ￿rst the historical foundations of the study
is in order.
2 Historical Foundations
This section provides the historical basis for our choice of the di⁄erent transmission mech-
anisms between colonial origin and economic growth performance.
Historical sources claim that as of the late nineteenth century, Britain was the only
imperial power that was committed to free trade, whilst the other European powers,
notably France, were still building up their rival industries through protectionism.5 Cor-
respondingly, whilst British colonial economies were not under the obligation to export
only to England, French colonial economies were compelled to trade mainly with France.6
As such, it can be argued that one of the important legacies of British colonisation on its
former colonies has been a long exposure to world competition through trade openness,7
which might possibly explain why former British SSA colonies adjusted more rapidly to
structural adjustment programmes implemented in the late 1980￿ s in comparison with
their French counterparts.8
Another channel through which the legacy of colonisation might have been perpetu-
ated, which does not yet seem to ￿nd expression in the literature, is the distortionary
impact of di⁄erent colonial taxation systems on private investment incentives. Historical
5Grier (1999:320) reports that since 1830, Britain has had a free trade policy and as from 1846, British
colonies were no longer forced to give British goods preferential treatment. Hence these colonies have had
a long history of free trade, while the French enforced mercantilist and protectionist measures throughout
the colonial period. For additional evidence see also, Maddison (1971:35), Bolton (1973:24) and Duignan
& Gann (1975).
6See Fieldhouse (1966:306)
7During the inter-war period, Nigeria alone exported ￿ve times as much as all the French colonies in
West Africa, Rostowski & Stacescu (2006:12).
8The evidence also points to the fact that former British SSA colonies grew much faster than French
SSA colonies after structural adjustment.
3sources9 claim that the dual system of administration of their colonies, characterised by
punitive taxation and forced labour on the general population, was a distinctive feature
of French colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa.10 The implications of this unique approach
to local administration is to be found in the colonial legacy of taxation pursued in the
post-colonial era.
By contrast, Maddison (1971) has argued that one of the important legacies of British
colonisation is that its former colonies inherited relatively lower levels of taxation, because
indirect rule is cheaper to administer compared to direct rule. Austin (2008:1011) also
argues that until very late in the colonial period, there was no direct taxation in southern
Ghana and Nigeria - two of the most successful British colonies in tropical Africa. If this
is true, then it could imply that former British colonies are associated with relatively
lower degrees of distortions of economic activity through taxation, which could in turn
imply greater private investment incentives or more free trade on the domestic scale.
Furthermore, it is well documented that educational policy was potentially the area
of greatest distinction between di⁄erent imperial colonial administrations. It is generally
claimed that England pursued more enlightened educational policies in its colonies than
did France, whose educational objective aimed essentially at training personnel for the
colonial bureaucracy. For instance, Gann & Duignan (1970:354), argue that:
"mission teachers in British Africa not only taught their pupils how to read and
write, but also taught them how to try their hands at many di⁄erent jobs because
the teachers themselves, besides giving lessons, were also engaged in such diverse
activities as constructing their own buildings, cultivating their own crops, experi-
menting in agriculture and building roads".
In addition, it is widely held that primary instruction in former British colonies was
administered through village schools using native teachers and the local vernacular lan-
guages of the people, whilst in former French colonies, pupils were generally boarded from
their homes to far away schools where they were taught in the French language, using
French textbooks, and by French teachers. This is suggestive of a di⁄erent approach to
educational provision with di⁄erent repercussions on post-independence human capital
accumulation and development.
9See for instance, Crowder (1968:185) and Asiwaju (2000).
10Crowder (1968:186) argues that the "code d￿ indigØnat", which was instituted in French sub-Saharan
Africa aimed at achieving the employment of native labour through the imposition of relatively high taxes
on blacks and in default of payment they would incur a sentence of forced labour.
4Yet another important factor that shaped colonial institutions and hence the colonial
heritage, that has often been overlooked in the colonisation and growth literature, is geog-
raphy11 or the in￿ uence of the disease environment. As Acemoglu et al (2001) have shown,
the major colonial powers did not choose empires randomly. Klerman et al (2008) argue
that England, being the dominant colonial power in the late nineteenth century tended
to colonise places of strategic advantage12 such as coastal locations or colonies with nat-
ural resource endowments. This ￿rst-mover advantage or "selection bias" might possibly
suggest that British colonies were endowed with better initial conditions, consistent with
the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) hypothesis.13
As evidence, Klerman et al (2008) show that colonial origin does not matter after
geographical factors are controlled for, which lends support to the selection bias hypothesis
that di⁄erences in pre-colonisation initial conditions rather than in colonial policy (legal,
educational, or other) are the best explanation for di⁄erent growth rates amongst former
colonies. However, Klerman et al (2008) results on geography are inconclusive as they
themselves admit.14
Finally, an important colonial legacy that also merits attention in the empirical liter-
ature is the impact of the Franc CFA15 currency board which links France to most of its
former SSA colonies. The Franc CFA currency board, it is argued, has been instrumental
in lowering in￿ ation and the black market exchange premium while enhancing the con-
tribution of imports to GDP growth. However, as the evidence also suggests, the impact
of the currency board on market distortion could go the other way.16 Considering the
fact that almost all former British SSA colonies have ￿ oating exchange regimes, these
di⁄erent exchange regime structures might well serve as a plausible channel for explaining
the di⁄erent growth outcomes in the two former empires.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the legal origins theory, no matter how
11Sachs (2003) and Engerman & Sokolo⁄ (2002) have shown that geography matters for economic
growth and that its e⁄ect could either be direct or indirectly through institutions.
12Britain in Egypt is often quoted as a good example as it provided a naval vantage point in the
Mediterranean, as well as a gateway to India through the Suez Canal, Thorn (2000:11).
13According to this hypothesis, the depth of colonial engagement in moulding growth-conducive insti-
tutions is a function of the ￿rst-mover advantage.
14For instance, Klerman et al (2008:19) admit that their results controlling for geographical factors are
highly dependent on their de￿nition of the regional dummies for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
and on which set of countries is analysed.
15The Franc CFA stands for Franc de la CommunautØ Financiere en Afrique meaning Financial Com-
munity of Africa Franc.
16For instance, one of the main arguments for devaluing the Franc CFA by 50% in January 1994, was
because of its excessively distortionary e⁄ects on the economies of those countries. See Collier & Gunning
(1999).
5elaborate and expansive its proponents make it to be,17 is unlikely to be the sole or
even the main source of in￿ uence of colonial legacy on the post-independence economic
performances of former colonies. Klerman et al (2008:4) also agree that there is no
rationale for broadening the conception of legal origin to include all aspects of colonial
policy since this is equivalent to substituting this broad conception of legal origin with
the identity of the colonial power.
Because colonial origin encompasses all aspects of colonial legacy including legal ori-
gin, studies seeking a holistic understanding of the in￿ uence of colonisation on former
colonies￿post-independence economic performances should instead be analysing the im-
pact of colonial origin on growth alongside its di⁄erent transmission channels, rather than
just the impact of one channel (i.e. legal origin).
The tasks of this paper therefore, is to investigate further the channels through which
colonial origin a⁄ects economic outcomes, using only the SSA dataset. The interest in a
SSA case study is based on two main reasons.
The ￿rst and most important reason why a separate study of SSA might prove insight-
ful to the current debate is that SSA o⁄ers a more balanced framework of analysis than
the world pool of colonies owing to the fact that nearly all French colonies studied in the
world sample are from SSA, while British colonies in the sample are spread more evenly
across the globe.18 The preceding point is dramatised by the fact that nearly all SSA
countries experienced poor growth performances during most of the period of these cross-
country studies. To eliminate this possible selection bias against former French colonies,
it is appropriate not only to compare them with other countries in the same region, but
also with countries that faced similar growth challenges such as structural adjustment
programmes, during the same period of time.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, one of the currently contentious issues in colonial
origins debate is the in￿ uence of geography or "selection bias". Because European powers
did not choose empires randomly, the possibility of "selection bias" explaining the observed
growth di⁄erential amongst former colonies is plausible. However, previous studies have
either not given a thorough examination of this transmission mechanism or the existing
17Following the persistent lack of signi￿cance of legal origins in growth regressions, La Porta et al
(2008:286) in their latest article, have adopted a somewhat broader and seemingly ambiguous conception
of the notion of legal origin "as a style of social control of economic life" implying legal origin should
stand for "strategies of social control that can either support private market outcomes or implement
speci￿c state policies".
18For instance, in Grier￿ s (1999) study, the only non-African former French colonies included are Re-
union and Haiti.
6evidence is inconclusive.
Therefore, by focusing on a sample of countries with similar geographical conditions,19
a SSA case study isolates "pure" geographical conditions from other forms of selection,
thereby allowing for a thorough exploration of the di⁄erent transmission mechanisms
between colonial origins and economic outcomes.
In summary, this paper will investigate the following likely channels of transmission
between colonial origin and economic growth outcomes:
The human capital channel: which will be proxied by two variables, namely, sec-
ondary enrolment rates during 1960-2000 (SEC), and the average schooling years in the
population aged 15 and above during 1960-2000 (AYS).
The trade openness channel: which will be proxied by two variables namely, openness
to international trade during 1960-2000 (OPEN) and export share in GDP during 1960-
2000 (EXP).
The market distortion channel: which will be captured by the black market exchange
rate premium during 1960-2000 (BMP).
The selection bias channel: which will be captured by the interaction of two variables
namely, natural resource endowments dummy20 and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation in-
dex (ETHNIC). The dummy for natural resource endowments (DNRES) captures the
presence of natural resources in the country and takes the value 1, if the country has a
rich endowment of either oil, gold, diamonds or cocoa and zero otherwise. Some historical
sources claim that colonial policies in black Africa tended to succeed most in societies
that are both ethnically divided and resource rich.21 Hence the intuition to interact nat-
ural resources with ethnic diversity in capturing this speci￿c type of selection bias.22 The
product of the interaction of these two variables is denoted by ETHNRES.
It is also important to note that in 1960, former British SSA colonies had, on average,
19The summary descriptive statistics in Figure 1 in the Appendix show that 20% of former French SSA
colonies are endowed with natural resources as opposed to 25% in former British colonies. Also, 30% of
former French colonies are landlocked, as opposed to about 44% landlock rate in British colonies.
20Rhoda (1973:19), Bolton (1973:24) and Douglas (1978:265) have argued that an important motive
for acquiring colonies was the search for raw materials for use in production in the imperial economy.
21According to Asiwaju (2000), the colonial policy of "divide and rule" was most e⁄ective in ethnically
divided societies because, by pitting one ethnic group against another, the colonisers were able to extract
a greater share of the colony￿ s resources.
22Furthermore, the association between natural resources and ethnic diversity, as institutional deter-
minants of growth, is not new in the empirical growth literature. For instance, Mauro (1995) shows that
natural resources-rich countries which are also ethnically divided tend to grow much slower. Collier et al
(2006) identify the presence of natural resources as one of the main drivers of societal con￿ ict which can
be negatively associated with growth. Svensson (2000) provides evidence to show that countries that are
both commodity (like cocoa or oil) producers and ethnically divided are likely to be more corrupt.
7lower per capita GDP than former French colonies, which suggests that convergence might
also be part of the story. However, in the context of this study, we do not directly inves-
tigate the convergence channel, although we control for convergence e⁄ects by including
the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1960 in our regressions.23
Table 1 above presents results from partial correlations of the di⁄erent causal mech-
anisms on colonial origins. Panel A shows the association or correlation between the
di⁄erent causal mechanisms and colonial origin, controlling for initial income levels in
1960. Panel B performs the same exercise but further controls for initial colonial condi-
tions, in other words, the level of each transmission channel at the end of colonial rule.24
The intended goal is to di⁄erentiate the e⁄ects due to the legacy of colonisation from
those resulting from the actions of the independent nations themselves.
The results in Panel A show that, in comparison with former French colonies, former
British colonies are strongly associated with high human capital endowment as proxied
by the two human capital measures listed above. Panel B also suggests that this high
human capital endowment is largely the result of the legacy of colonisation and not so
much the result of post-independence policies. In fact, the positive sign on SEC60 in
Panel B suggests a strong persistence of the colonial legacy of human capital in the post-
independence era.
The results in Table 1 also suggest that former British colonies are associated with
greater trade openness than former French colonies and this performance is linked to
the colonial legacy of trade openness. Panel B also suggests a strong persistence of the
colonial legacy of trade openness in the post independence era.
Table 1 further suggests that former British colonies are associated with greater market
distortion than former French colonies, as proxied by the black market exchange premium.
Furthermore, this market distortion reputation, as Panel B suggests, is partly as a result
of the legacy of colonisation.
Finally, Panel A suggests that, in comparison with the French, the British Crown
generally tended to choose colonies that are both resource rich and ethnically divided.
This also suggests that former British colonies are more prone to the "natural resource
curse" than former French colonies.
23Quah (1993) argues that the sign on initial per capita income can either be positive or negative
depending on the sample.
24The initial colonial condition variables are measured in the year of independence of the country or in
1960 for countries where pre-1960 data is not available (e.g. Sudan, Ghana and Guinea). For notational
purposes, these variables are associated with the symbol "60", in order to distinguish them from their
post independence counterparts.
8Table 1: Partial Correlations of Di⁄erent Transmission Mechanisms on Colonial Origins
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(1.43) (0.86) (2.69) (0.99) (13.66) (1.52) (0.02)
No. OBS 781 612 1382 1199 1071 1271 1394
R-SQUARED 0.18 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.03 0.14 0.08
PANEL B
SEC AYS OPEN EXP BMP ETHNRES LANDLOCK
BCORG 1.56 0.82￿￿￿ 12.77￿￿￿ -4.87￿￿￿ 61.57￿￿￿
(1.99) (0.12) (2.33) (1.25) (15.99)
OCORG -7.38￿￿￿ 0.004 1.14 -9.19￿￿￿ 13.42











LOGPCGDP60 -1.36 0.39￿￿￿ 9.88￿￿￿ -0.96 -20.33￿
(1.75) (0.07) (1.98) (1.20) (11.60)
CONSTANT 22.95￿ -2.04￿￿￿ -27.15￿ 21.58￿￿ 150.22￿
(12.86) (0.48) (14.42) (8.36) (82.04)
No. OBS. 776 558 1382 1149 994
R-SQUARED 0.33 0.64 0.33 0.40 0.08
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 1% level of signi￿cance is denoted by ￿￿￿; 5% by ￿￿
and 10% by ￿
(1) These results are robust to the exclusion of Botswana. French Colonial Origin (FCORG) is the omitted category.
N.B. ETHNRES and LANDLOCK remain unchanged in Panel B.
9The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is the methodology section. Section 3
presents our most important results and checks for their robustness. Section 4 compares
our results to those in the literature, notably by Klerman et al (2008), Rostowski &
Stacescu (2006), Bertocchi & Canova (2002) and Grier (1999). Section 5 concludes.
3 Methodology
This section describes the empirical model, the estimators, the estimation strategy and
also presents the variables and datasets used in the study.
3.1 Empirical Model
The question we seek to answer is whether colonial origin really matters for income in
SSA during 1960-2000. If yes, what are its channels of transmission?
To answer this question, we specify the regression model as follows:
GROWit = ￿ + ￿iCOLOi + ￿iTRANSMit + ￿iXit + ￿i + "it (1)
where GROWit is income (natural logarithm of per capita GDP Purchasing Power Par-
ity). COLOi is a matrix of colonial origin dummies comprising BCORG (which takes the
value 1 for British colonial origin and zero otherwise), FCORG (which takes the value
1 for French colonial origin and zero otherwise) and OCORG (which takes the value 1
for non-British and non-French colonial origins and zero otherwise).25 TRANSMit is a
matrix of control variables that serve as likely transmission channels between colonial
origin and growth, while Xit is a matrix of other control variables that are standard in
the growth literature, notably - initial real per capital incomes, population growth, invest-
ment, in￿ ation and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. ￿i is a vector of individual-country
e⁄ects re￿ ecting unobservable country heterogeneity and "it is a vector of error terms.
The advantage of using panel data is that it allows for individual country heterogeneity,
in addition to the fact that it also allows for less collinearity among the variables, more
degrees of freedom and more e¢ ciency, Baltagi (2005:5).
25Of course, only two of the colonial origin dummies enter the regression at a time, while the third
dummy serves as base.
103.2 Choice of Estimator
We perform the analysis on the empirical model speci￿ed in equation 1 above, using a
core dataset of thirty-eight (38) SSA countries during 1960-2000. A key consideration in
choosing a suitable estimator for the model is how well the estimator handles the problem
of endogeneity resulting from the fact that some of the explanatory variables might be
correlated with the un-observed country e⁄ects. As Baltagi (2005:125) argues, the ￿xed
e⁄ects (within) estimator assumes that all the explanatory variables are related to the
individual e⁄ects and the within-estimator is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE)
once the individual e⁄ects are modelled as a linear function of all the explanatory variables.
Using the within-transformation (henceforth, FE) in estimating equation 1 above, results
in the elimination of the ￿i term, and hence the bias. However, the FE also eliminates
the time-invariant regressors, and is therefore incapable of giving estimates of ￿i.26
The random-e⁄ects (RE) model, on the other hand, assumes no correlation between
the explanatory variables and the individual e⁄ects, implying that, in the presence of
endogeneity RE will yield biased estimates. Hence, inferences from the RE model are
likely to be misleading. This is equally true for the OLS estimator, which also assumes
exogeneity of all regressors and the random individual e⁄ects.
Against these two contrasting worlds of all or nothing correlation between the individ-
ual e⁄ects and the regressors, Hausman and Taylor (1981) in Baltagi et al (2003) proposed
a model where some of the regressors but not all, are correlated with the individual ef-
fects. The Hausman-Taylor (HT) model thus bridges the two extreme worlds of all (FE
world) or nothing (RE world) choice of correlation between the individual e⁄ects and the
regressors. As Baltagi et al (2003:362) have argued, the HT model is preferable whenever
the model requires some of the regressors, but not all, to be correlated with the individual
e⁄ects.
The HT model can be written as:
yit = Xit￿ + Zi￿ + ￿i + ￿it (2)
where i = 1;2;::::;N and t = 1;2;:::;T. ￿i is IID(0;￿2
￿) and ￿it is IID(0;￿2
￿).
Both ￿i and ￿it are independent of each other and among themselves. The Zi are indi-
vidual time-invariant variables.
26Baltagi (2005:13) argues that the within estimator is incapable of estimating the e⁄ect of any time-
invariant variable like colonial origins, sex, race, religion, schooling or union participation because these
time-invariant variables are wiped out by the deviations from mean transformations.
11Hausman and Taylor split X = [X1;X2], and Z = [Z1;Z2] into two sets of variables
such that X1 is n ￿ k1; X2 is n ￿ k2; Z1 is n ￿ g1; Z2 is n ￿ g2 and n = NT.
X1 and Z1 are assumed exogenous and not correlated with ￿i and ￿it, while X2 and
Z2 are endogenous due to their correlation with ￿i but not with ￿it.
Under equation 2 above, OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates, while the
FE (or within-transformation) estimator gives consistent estimates. The FE sleeps the ￿i
and removes the bias, but, in the process, it also eliminates the time-invariant variables,
Zi. Hence it cannot yield estimates of ￿. The RE estimator, which is Generalised Least
Square (GLS) estimation on equation 2, ignores the endogeneity due to the presence of
the ￿i term and will therefore yield biased though consistent estimates.
To get around the shortcomings of the within-estimator in estimating the time-invariant
regressors, Hausman and Taylor suggest an instrumental variable estimator which premul-
tiplies equation 2 by ￿
￿1
2 where ￿ is the variance-covariance term of the error component
￿i+￿it; and then performs two-stage least squares (2SLS) using as instruments [Q;X1;Z1].
Q is the within-transformation matrix with e y = Qy having a typical element f yit = yit￿yi
where yi is the individual mean. As Baltagi et al (2003) show, this turns out to be




as the set of instruments.27
It is important to emphasize that the order of identi￿cation (k1 > g2) must hold for
equation 2 to be non-singular. In other words, the number of time-varying exogenous
regressors X1, must be at least as large as the number of individual time-invariant en-
dogenous regressors Z2. Speci￿cally, the model is said to be just-identi￿ed, when k1 = g2
and in this case, the HT estimates of ￿ are equivalent to estimates obtained from 2SLS
estimation. The model is said to be over-identi￿ed, when k1 > g2 and in this case, the HT
estimates of ￿ are more e¢ cient than estimates obtained from the FE estimator. Finally,
the model is under-identi￿ed when k1 < g2 and in this case, the HT model cannot provide
estimates of ￿.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
The empirical strategy consists of two stages. Stage one is based on simple OLS estimation
while stage two employs the HT estimator.
27Baltagi et al (2003) also argue that the HT estimator is based on an instrumental variable estimator
which uses both the between and within variation of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments.
More speci￿cally, the individual means of the strictly exogenous regressors are used as instruments for
the time-invariant regressors that are correlated with the individual e⁄ects, as in Baltagi (2005).
123.3.1 Stage One
In the ￿rst stage, we test the hypothesis that colonial origin matters for income in SSA,
using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. We
estimate twenty di⁄erent model speci￿cations of the OLS model with per capita GDP
purchasing power parity levels (constant 1995 international $) as the dependent variable
in all speci￿cations. Model 1 includes only colonial origin dummies as the explanatory
variables. Models 2 to 6 investigate the in￿ uence of the market distortion transmission
channel using black market exchange rate premium as proxy. In particular, model 2
controls only for the level of market distortion at the end of colonial rule (or initial
colonial conditions). Model 3 includes, in addition to all the variables in model 2, the
interaction terms of colonial origin with initial levels of black market exchange premium.
The reason for introducing the interaction terms is to ￿nd out whether di⁄erences in
growth as a result of market distortion can be attributed to di⁄erences in colonial origins.
More generally, the interaction terms for each transmission channel are obtained by
multiplying each colonial origin dummy by the variable that proxies for the channel of
interest. Its purpose is to tell us whether the impact of that channel on economic per-
formance in a speci￿c colonial origin context is more important than in another colonial
origin context.28
Model 4 controls only for variations in the black market premium during 1960-2000.
The objective is to capture possible changes in the colonial legacy of market distortion,
brought about by changes in post-independence policies. Model 5 includes, in addition
to all the variables in model 4, the interaction terms of colonial origin with black market
exchange rate premium during 1960-2000. Model 6 includes all the variables used in
models 1 to 5. The purpose for this is to distinguish whether what really mattered was
the persistence of initial conditions left by the colonisers, or whether the evolution of the
society after independence had any impact on post independence economic performance.
In other words, "removing" the impact of the history of the coloniser so as to see whether
the changes that the newly independent nations "added on" could separately explain the
economic performance path of di⁄erent countries.
Models 7 to 11 investigate the in￿ uence of the trade openness transmission channel
using openness to international trade as proxy. The approach followed is similar to that
28The growth model with interaction terms can be expressed as: Y = a + bX1 + cX2 + dX1X2 + ￿i;
where X1 and X2 represent the matrix of transmission channels and the vector of colonial origin dummies
respectively. @Y
@X1 = b + dX2 tells us whether the impact of a channel, X1, is di⁄erent in British colonies
as opposed to French colonies.
13in models 2 to 6 above.
Models 12 to 16 follow a similar approach to models 2 to 6, in investigating the in-
￿ uence of the human capital transmission channel, while models 17 and 18 investigate
the in￿ uence of the selection bias channel. Model 19 includes, besides the colonial origin
dummies, the levels of all four transmission channels at independence, and their evolution
during 1960-2000. In addition, model 19 also includes the interaction terms of colonial
origin dummies with the respective time elements of the di⁄erent transmission channels.
Model 20 includes, in addition to all the variables in model 19, a set of ￿ve control variables
that are standard in empirical growth models, namely, initial real per capita income, pop-
ulation growth, investment, in￿ ation growth and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. Model
20 also includes a variable called DUREE, which captures the duration of colonial rule.
Considering the fact that the results obtained under OLS estimation are biased and
inconsistent, inferences made on them are likely to be misleading. Thus, the second stage
of the estimation strategy will consist of submitting the above strategy to an alternative
and more appropriate estimator namely, the HT estimator.
3.3.2 Stage Two
Stage two estimation comprises four model speci￿cations of the HT model with the natural
logarithm of per capita GDP PPP (levels) as the dependent variable in all speci￿cations,
as before. Model 1 includes only the four transmission channels, besides the colonial
origin dummies. Model 2 includes all the interaction terms of the four channels explored
in model 1, in addition to the channels themselves. Model 3 includes the levels of each
transmission channel at independence, in addition to all the variables in model 2. Model 4
controls for the standard determinants of growth (the same ￿ve controls used in stage one
above) and includes all the variables in model 3. Model 4 also controls for the duration
of colonial rule (DUREE).
3.4 Variables and Data
We classify SSA countries into three broad colonial origin families, namely - British colo-
nial origin (BCORG) for colonies that acquired their independence from Britain, French
colonial origin (FCORG) for countries that acquired independence from France and other
colonial origin (OCORG) for countries that acquired independence from European powers
other than Britain and France. By basing colonial origin on the identity of the coloniser
through which independence was acquired, we are assuming in line with the tradition in
14the literature, that it is the colonial power that granted independence that signi￿cantly
shaped the country￿ s post-colonial future.29
The decision to bundle all the non-British and non-French SSA colonial origins (mainly
Portuguese, Belgian, Italian and Spanish) into one common group (Other Colonial Ori-
gins) is for purely practical reasons as the number of countries in these categories are
relatively small. Countries that witnessed a relatively short period of colonisation (e.g.
Ethiopia) or which were never colonised (e.g. Liberia) are excluded from the sample.
Furthermore, countries that had multiple colonisation experiences with the experience of
the previous colonisers impacting for a signi￿cant period of the country￿ s colonial history
(e.g. South Africa) are also excluded. We also exclude Cape Verde and the Comoros
Islands for lack of consistent data. See Appendix A for a classi￿cation of the countries in
the dataset.
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP
PPP (constant 1995 international $) obtained from The Africa Research Program datasets.
We use annual data for all variables covering the period 1960-2000.30 Annualised data in
a panel framework such as this, is suitable for di⁄erentiating the e⁄ects of initial colonial
conditions31 from those brought about by changes in post-independence policies.
Besides the colonial origin dummies, our other choice explanatory variables are a set of
variables that capture the four di⁄erent transmission mechanisms between colonial origin
and growth. These are:
The gross secondary enrolment rates during 1960-2000 (SEC) to capture the
human capital transmission channel. The conventional growth literature suggests that
human capital enhancement is good for growth either because it raises the overall pro-
ductivity of the economy or because it favours the development of pro-growth institu-
29This might be a signi￿cant limitation, especially for those countries that had more than one European
colonial experience. This is especially true for Cameroon and all the former German colonies (Togo,
Tanzania and Namibia). One way to get around this limitation is to add another set of dummy variables
capturing ￿prior colonisers￿ . However, this option leaves us with another problem - that of a small
sample - as a result of the reduced degrees of freedom. Furthermore, this detail adds less to the analysis.
Admittedly, including the "prior colonisers" would add substantially to the results only where the ￿rst
coloniser stayed for a signi￿cant period. This is perhaps true only for South Africa, which had a long
Dutch tenure followed by extended British rule, but we have excluded this case from our sample.
30We use the levels of the dependent variable instead of rates, as is the tradition in the literature,
because most of our explanatory variables are in levels.
31Although the impact of initial colonial conditions is a cross-country issue that is better captured in
cross-sectional studies, by including the initial conditions alongside the annualised data in a panel frame-
work, we e⁄ectively isolate the impact of initial colonial conditions from subsequent post-independence
changes.
15tions.32 However, this evidence is inconclusive as other empirical studies, notably by
Pritchett (2001) suggest that growth in human capital can be detrimental for per capita
GDP growth. The interaction terms of colonial origin with secondary enrolment rates
during 1960-2000, are SECBRI, SECFRE, and SECOTH, for British, French and Other
colonial origins respectively. Similarly, the interaction terms of colonial origin with ini-
tial secondary enrolment rates in the year of independence of the country (SEC60), are
SEC60BRI, SEC60FRE, and SEC60OTH, for British, French and Other colonial origins
respectively.
The average share of exports and imports in GDP during 1960-2000 (OPEN)
to capture the trade openness transmission mechanism. The literature suggests that SSA
countries that were more open to trade have indeed grown faster than those that were
not.33 Rodrik (2002) however holds a dissenting view. Thus, there is no unanimity as
to the expected sign of the openness variable in the growth regressions. The interaction
terms of colonial origin with openness during 1960-2000 are OPENBRI, OPENFRE and
OPENOTH, for British, French and Other colonial origins respectively. Similarly, the
interaction terms of colonial origin with initial openness measure in the year of indepen-
dence of the country (OPEN60), are OPEN60BRI, OPEN60FRE, and OPEN60OTH, for
British, French and Other colonial origins respectively.
An annual index of the black market exchange rate premium during 1960-2000
(BMP) to capture the market distortion mechanism. Easterly & Levine (1997) ￿nd a
strong negative association between black market premiums and growth. The interaction
terms of colonial origin with market distortion during 1960-2000 are BMPBRI, BMPFRE
and BMPOTH, for British, French and Other colonial origins respectively. Similarly, the
interaction terms of colonial origin with initial market distortion measures in the year of
independence of the country (BMP60), are BMP60BRI, BMP60FRE, and BMP60OTH,
for British, French and Other colonial origins respectively.
Finally, a time-invariant index (ETHNRES) obtained from the interaction of the
natural resource endowment dummy with the ethnic fractionalisation index to capture
the selection bias transmission channel. The expected sign of ETHNRES in the growth
regression is negative, according to the evidence from Mauro (1995). The interaction
terms of colonial origin with "selection bias" channel are ETRESBRI, ETRESFRE and
ETRESOTH, for British, French and Other colonial origins respectively.
32For instance, Easterly & Levine (1997) and Glaeser et al (2004) ￿nd a positive contribution of human
capital to GDP growth in their regressions.
33See for instance, Sachs & Warner (1997).
16In addition to this set of transmission mechanisms, we introduce a variable, DUREE,
to capture the duration of colonial rule. DUREE is obtained by subtracting the respective
country independence year from the year that the country was ￿rst colonised.34
Furthermore, we introduce another set of ￿ve control variables that are standard in
the growth literature. These are:
The natural logarithm of initial real per capita GDP in 1960 (LOGPCGDP60)
to capture convergence e⁄ects. Quah (1993) argues that due to the problem of reversion
to the mean, the sign on initial per capita income can either be positive or negative
depending on the sample.
The growth rate of population during 1960-2000 (GPO) to control for the e⁄ect
of demographic factors on growth. We follow the endogenous growth literature, notably by
Kremer (1993), in suggesting a possible correlation between labour force growth (prox-
ied by population growth) and income growth. The two are expected to be positively
correlated. Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) suggest the opposite.
The growth rate of in￿ ation during 1960-2000 (INFL) to capture the negative ef-
fects of price instability on growth. Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1977) in Grier (1999:322)
both claim that in￿ ation uncertainty increases price variability, thus harming economic
growth.
The average share of real investment35 in GDP purchasing power parity during
1960-2000 (INV) to account for the contribution of physical capital accumulation in GDP
growth. The standard neoclassical growth literature suggests that investment in physical
capital is good for growth during transitional dynamics, although this might not be the
case at steady states. The expected sign on INV in the regressions should therefore be
positive.
Finally, we indicate the ￿ priori classi￿cation of these variables into the various HT
categories. The HT model requires classi￿cation of variables into the following four cate-
gories, namely, time-variant exogenous variables, time-invariant exogenous variables, time-
variant endogenous variables and time-invariant endogenous variables. However, the latter
category need not be included for the model to be correctly speci￿ed.
Based on economic theory, we classify our variables in the HT model as exogenous
due to their supposed non-correlation with both the un-observed individual e⁄ects (￿i)
34It would have been consistent to take into account only the year that the last coloniser arrived (for
those countries that had multiple colonisation experiences), but this detail would not add much to the
present analysis.
35The variable includes both private and public investment.
17and with the error term ￿it. Similarly, we classify some variables as endogenous in the
model because of their supposed correlation with ￿i but not with ￿it. We thus regroup
the variables into the following four HT categories viz.
Time-Variant Exogenous Variables: The black market exchange rate premium
during 1960-2000 (BMP), and the interactions of colonial origin with black market premi-
ums, BMPBRI, BMPFRE and BMPOTH. Following Easterly & Levine (1997), we classify
black market exchange premium as exogenous in the HT model because it tends to cap-
ture growth-inhibiting institutional imperfections that might not necessarily be correlated
with the individual country e⁄ects.
Time-Variant Endogenous Variables: Secondary enrolment rates during 1960-
2000 (SEC), Openness during 1960-2000 (OPEN), Investment during 1960-2000 (INV),
In￿ ation during 1960-2000 (INFL), and Population growth during 1960-2000 (GPO). Ac-
cordingly, we also include the following interaction terms, SECBRI, SECFRE, SECOTH
and OPENBRI, OPENFRE, OPENOTH for schooling and openness variables respec-
tively. Following the tradition in the empirical growth literature, we classify these vari-
ables as endogenous in the HT model.36
Time-Invariant Endogenous Variables: Secondary enrolment rates at indepen-
dence (SEC60), and openness at independence (OPEN60).
Time-Invariant Exogenous Variables: British colonial origin countries (BCORG),
French colonial origin countries (FCORG), other colonial origin countries (OCORG),37
duration of colonial rule (DUREE), the black market exchange rate premium at indepen-
dence (BMP60), the ethnic fractionalisation - natural resource endowment index (ETH-
NRES), and the natural logarithm of initial real per capita income (LOGPCGDP60). We
also include the following interaction terms for ethnic fractionalisation - natural resource
endowment index, ETRESBRI, ETRESFRE, and ETRESOTH.
Figure 1 in the Appendix provides summary descriptive statistics for each variable
that we use in the regressions. Panel A of Figure 1 describes statistics for the full SSA
sample, while Panel B compares the means of variables by colonial origins. Most of our
data comes from The Africa Research Program dataset, and Global Development Finance
and World Development Indicators. Appendix B provides a full list of variable de￿nitions
and sources.
36For instance, Glaeser et al (2004) treat human capital as endogenous while Rostowski & Stacescu
(2006) treat both human capital and openness as endogenous in their regressions.
37The intuition for placing colonial origin dummies in this category is mainly because of selection
e⁄ects.
18Considering the initial conditions at independence, Panel B of Figure 1 suggests that
former British colonies had a lower initial GDP in 1960 than former French colonies. The
evidence also suggests that at independence, former British colonies were more open to
trade, had higher secondary enrolment rates and greater market distortion than former
French colonies.
During the post-independence period from 1960-2000, Panel B suggests that former
British colonies continued to experience greater openness to trade, higher secondary en-
rolment rates and greater market distortion than former French colonies. It is also striking
to note that, in comparison with French colonial origin, British and Other colonial origins
witnessed signi￿cantly longer durations of colonisation.
4 Results
This section presents results from the two-stage estimation strategy followed by checks
for their robustness. A discussion of the results concludes the section.
4.1 Results using OLS estimator
Figure 2 in the Appendix reports results of twenty panel estimations of income (natural
logarithm of per capita GDP PPP) on colonial origin sequentially controlling for each
of the transmission channels (models 2 - 18), then controlling for all the transmission
channels together (model 19), and ￿nally controlling for other determinants of income
and the duration of colonisation (model 20).
The results in model 1 of Figure 2 suggest that colonial origin does matter for income
levels in SSA during 1960-2000, such that former British colonies have an income level
slightly higher than former French colonies (about 0.2 times higher). The introduction of
the colonial initial black market exchange premium conditions at independence in model
2 completely eliminates the economic and statistical signi￿cance of the British colonial
origin dummy (BCORG), and the coe¢ cient on initial black market premium is highly
statistically signi￿cant although economically unimportant. Controlling for di⁄erences
in initial market distortion conditions across colonial origins in model 3 gives no useful
insight, as all of the variables are either economically unimportant or statistically insignif-
icant. This suggests that initial market distortion conditions can not be held in explaining
income di⁄erences amongst former SSA colonies during 1960-2000.
19Controlling for only the post-independence market distortion conditions during 1960-
2000 (BMP) in model 4, slightly reduces both the economic and statistical signi￿cance
of BCORG, although the market distortion variable (BMP) is economically unimportant
(although signi￿cant at the 1% level). This suggests that the post-independence market
distortion policies of the former colonies might be partly responsible for the observed
income di⁄erences amongst these countries. The results in model 5, which controls for
possible di⁄erences in post-independence market distortion policies across colonial origins,
does not alter the magnitude or statistical signi￿cance of BCORG, and all the distortion
interaction terms (BMPBRI, BMPFRE & BMPOTH) are economically and statistically
insigni￿cant.
The results in model 6, which controls for the impact of both the colonial initial market
distortion condition as well as the post-independence market distortion conditions, gives
no useful insight as all of the variables are either economically unimportant or statistically
insigni￿cant. The tentative conclusion from models 2 to 6 is that, market distortion
reduces income in SSA during 1960-2000 but that di⁄erences in both the initial colonial
market distortion conditions as well as in the post independence market distortion policies
across colonial origins, can not explain the observed income di⁄erences amongst former
SSA colonies.
The results in model 7, where the initial colonial openness condition (OPEN60) along-
side colonial origin dummies explain income, suggest that in general, the initial openness
conditions of SSA countries at independence are not important in explaining post inde-
pendence income di⁄erences amongst them. Controlling for di⁄erences in initial open-
ness conditions across colonial origins in model 8, completely eliminates the economic
and statistical signi￿cance of the British colonial origin dummy (BCORG), while the
initial openness (OPEN60) and British colonial origin initial openness interaction term
(OPEN60BRI) are both statistically signi￿cant at 1%. The sign on OPEN60BRI is pos-
itive, suggesting that the initial conditions of openness are a strong predictor of income
in former British colonies. In other words, the legacy of trade openness might have con-
tributed to the marginally higher income levels in former British SSA colonies. The results
in model 9, where the post-independence openness conditions (OPEN) alongside colonial
origin dummies explain income, suggest that the post-independence openness conditions
of the countries are important in explaining post-independence income di⁄erences amongst
former SSA colonies.
Controlling for di⁄erences in post independence openness conditions across colonial
20origins in model 10 restores the statistical signi￿cance of BCORG,38 while the post inde-
pendence openness variable (OPEN) and British colonial origin post independence open-
ness interaction term (OPENBRI) are both statistically signi￿cant at 1%. OPENBRI has
a positive sign, suggesting that the post independence openness policies of former British
SSA colonies are also important in explaining the observed marginal di⁄erences in income
levels between former British and former French SSA colonies.
The results in model 11 which controls for the impact of both the colonial initial open-
ness condition (OPEN60) as well as the post-independence openness conditions (OPEN),39
show a slight reduction in the magnitude and statistical signi￿cance of BCORG, and both
OPEN60 and OPEN are highly statistically signi￿cant. Model 11 results also suggest that
for former British colonies, the colonial initial openness conditions (OPEN60BRI) mat-
tered more than the post-independence openness conditions (OPENBRI). The tentative
conclusions from models 7 to 11 are that:
- The colonial initial openness condition (OPEN60) in￿ uences post-independence in-
come levels negatively, whereas the post-independence openness conditions (OPEN) pos-
itively a⁄ects income. This suggests that di⁄erences in both OPEN60 and OPEN across
colonial origins, might help explain the observed di⁄erences in income levels amongst
former SSA colonies.
- Furthermore, the colonial initial openness condition has had a far greater impact
on income levels in former British colonies, than the post-independence openness condi-
tions.40
The results in model 12, where initial colonial education condition (SEC60) alongside
colonial origin dummies explain growth, show that BCORG is no longer economically and
statistically signi￿cant, whereas SEC60 is highly statistically signi￿cant. This suggests
that the initial education conditions of SSA countries at independence are important in
explaining post independence income di⁄erences amongst these countries. Controlling
for di⁄erences in initial education conditions across colonial origins in model 13 restores
some statistical signi￿cance to BCORG, while completely diminishing SEC60 in both
magnitude and statistical signi￿cance. However, both the British and Other colonial
origin initial education interaction terms (SEC60BRI & SEC60OTH) are positive and
highly signi￿cant at 1%. This suggests that, in comparison with former French colonies,
38BCORG also becomes economically meaningful, though assuming a negative sign.
39In addition to the respective interaction terms of the post independence variables.
40This could be explained by the fact that the marginal e⁄ects of openness in countries with more open
initial conditions is lesser than otherwise.
21the colonial initial education conditions in former British and Other colonies origins have
been more favourable to income during 1960-2000.
The results in model 14, where the post-independence education conditions (SEC)
alongside colonial origin dummies explain income, eliminate the statistical and economic
signi￿cance of BCORG. This suggests that the post-independence education conditions
of SSA countries are an important predictor of post-independence income.
Controlling for di⁄erences in post independence education conditions across colonial
origins in model 15 restores the statistical signi￿cance of BCORG, while diminishing the
magnitude and statistical signi￿cance of SEC. Furthermore, both the British and Other
colonial origin post independence education interaction terms (SECBRI & SECOTH) are
economically and statistically signi￿cant at 1%. This suggests that, in comparison with
former French colonies, the post-independence education conditions in former British and
Other colonies origins have been more favourable to income.
The results in model 16, which controls for the impact of the colonial initial edu-
cation condition (SEC60), the post-independence education conditions (SEC), as well
as the respective interaction terms of the latter, show a slight reduction in the mag-
nitude of BCORG and SEC.41 The British colonial origin initial education interaction
term (SEC60BRI) is however, no longer signi￿cant while the British colonial origin post-
independence education interaction term (SECBRI) remains signi￿cant at the 1% level.
The sign on SECBRI is positive, suggesting that, in comparison with former French
colonies, the post-independence education policies of former British colonies have been a
good predictor of income. Also, model 16 results suggest that both the colonial initial
education conditions as well as the post-independence education conditions, mattered for
income in Other colonial origin countries.
The tentative conclusions from models 12 to 16 are that:
- Both the colonial initial education condition (SEC60) and the post-independence
education conditions (SEC) positively in￿ uence post-independence income levels. Also,
both the initial and the post-independence education conditions in former British colonies
have contributed positively to income, with the contribution of post-independence edu-
cation policies outweighing that at independence. This suggests that di⁄erences in both
SEC60 and SEC across colonial origins, can help explain the observed income di⁄erences
amongst former SSA colonies.
The results in model 17, where pre-colonisation initial conditions or selection bias
41SEC also reduces in statistical signi￿cance, to the 10% level.
22(ETHNRES) alongside colonial origin dummies explain income, show that BCORG is no
longer economically and statistically signi￿cant, whereas ETHNRES is highly statistically
signi￿cant. This suggests that the initial conditions of SSA countries at the beginning of
colonisation are an important predictor of post independence income levels. Controlling
for di⁄erences in these pre-colonisation initial conditions across colonial origins in model
18 restores the statistical signi￿cance on BCORG, and both ETHNRES and the British
colonial origin selection interaction term (ETRESBRI) are highly statistically signi￿cant.
However, the sign on ETRESBRI is negative, suggesting that the pre-colonisation initial
conditions have had a net detrimental impact on post independence income levels in
former British colonies.
The results in model 19, which includes besides the colonial origin dummies, all the
four transmission channels (with their respective interaction terms) alongside the initial
levels of each transmission channel at independence, suggest the following:
- Both the initial and post-independence market distortion conditions are important
predictors of post independence income levels in SSA, although the magnitude of their
impacts is marginal. In comparison with former French colonies, market distortions have
had more detrimental impacts on income in former British colonies.
- Only the colonial initial openness condition can help in explaining income di⁄erences
amongst SSA countries, and the magnitude of its impact is marginal.
- Both the initial and post-independence education conditions can help in explaining
income di⁄erences amongst SSA countries. In comparison with former French colonies,
post-independence education policies in former British colonies have had a far more pos-
itive impact on income.
- In comparison with former French colonies, pre-colonisation initial conditions (se-
lection bias) have had more detrimental impacts on post independence income in former
British colonies.
These results signi￿cantly change upon controlling for the set of six conditioning vari-
ables included in model 20. Model 20 results now suggest that:
- The initial market distortion conditions and not the post-independence conditions,
are important in explaining income di⁄erences amongst SSA countries
- Both the initial and post-independence openness conditions are important in explain-
ing income di⁄erences
- Both the initial and post-independence education conditions are important in explain-
ing income di⁄erences
23- The pre-colonisation initial conditions (selection bias) are important in explaining
income di⁄erences.
The ￿ndings from these di⁄erent model speci￿cations give an idea of the possible
transmission channels between colonial origin and income in SSA. However, because of
the bias and inconsistency of OLS estimation, this evidence is inconclusive and requires
further investigation using alternative techniques and measurement.
4.2 Results using an Alternative Technique - The HT Estimator
Figure 3 in the Appendix provides results of four model speci￿cations of the HT estimation
of income on colonial origins. In model 1, where colonial origin dummies and the four post-
independence transmission variables alone explain income, the results suggest that the
post-independence policies of market distortion, openness and education, are important
predictors of income levels in former SSA colonies during 1960-2000.42 The results also
suggest that the pre-colonisation initial conditions weakly account for income levels in
former SSA colonies. In other words, there is weak evidence in favour of the selection bias
channel.
The results in model 2, which includes, in addition to all the variables in model 1, the
interaction terms for the respective transmission channels considered, suggest that di⁄er-
ences in post-independence openness and education policies are important in explaining
income di⁄erences amongst former SSA countries. In particular, the results suggest that,
in comparison with former French colonies, the post-independence openness and education
policies of former British colonies have contributed positively to income during 1960-2000.
After controlling further, for the colonial initial conditions, the results in model 3,
suggest that, the post-independence openness and education policies in former British
colonies (OPENBRI & SECBRI respectively) are responsible for the marginal income
di⁄erential between former British and former French SSA colonies.43
However, the results in model 4, which controls for the set of six conditioning variables
used in stage one above, suggest that the education channel matters only for former
British colonies while openness seems to matter only for Other colonial origin countries.
More speci￿cally, the results suggest that post-colonial education policies have been more
42However, only the openness and education channels are economically important.
43The non-signi￿cance of the initial colonial openness and education variables (OPEN60 & SEC60)
need not necessarily suggest that these do not matter. It could simply be that their e⁄ects have been
"caught up" in the post independence variables. This is plausible considering the fact that earlier in the
chapter, we noted a strong persistence of the British legacy of openness and human capital.
24favourable to growth in former British colonies, in comparison with former French colonies,
which probably explains the marginally higher income levels in former British colonies.
Similarly, post colonial openness policies have been more bene￿cial to income in Other
colonial origin countries, in comparison with former French colonies.
4.3 Robustness Checks
We use alternative proxies, namely, the average export share in GDP during 1960-2000
(EXP) and the average schooling years in the population aged 15 and above during 1960-
2000 (AYS) to check for robustness of the openness and human capital channels respec-
tively. Figure 4 in the Appendix provides results of four model speci￿cations of the HT
estimation following the same strategy employed in stage two above.
The results in Figure 4 uphold the previous HT results, suggesting that the post-
colonial human capital and openness policies are important in explaining the observed
income di⁄erences amongst former SSA colonies. More speci￿cally, former British colonies
have marginally higher income levels than former French colonies because of the favourable
contribution of post-independence human capital and openness policies. Also, the results
suggest that, in comparison with former French colonies, Other colonial origin countries
perform comparatively worse because of the negative contribution of human capital to
income.
It is worth mentioning that we repeated the empirical strategy used in this study
using ￿ve year averages of all variables that span through 1960-2000 and obtained similar
results. We do not report these results here due to space constraints. However, they are
available on request.
In conclusion, it is worth recalling that only two of the four transmission channels ex-
plored have emerged after subjection to alternative techniques and to alternative proxies,
namely - the openness and human capital channels. We do not ￿nd robust evidence in
support of the market distortion and selection bias channels.
5 Comparative Review of Prior Literature
The most recent work that is closest to ours in the literature is an article by Klerman et al
(2008). They investigate the in￿ uence of colonial and legal origins on growth during 1960-
2003 using a sample of 49 former colonies around the world. Their results unambiguously
25show that colonial origins matter for growth more than legal origin, and former British
colonies have grown faster than former French colonies.
An important similarity between our results and those of Klerman et al, is that colonial
origin matters because of di⁄erences in educational policies. It is important to mention
that although we share this same result, we use a slightly di⁄erent methodology from that
used by Klerman et al. While Klerman et al use only initial conditions at independence
to explain the subsequent growth path, this study analyses the pre-colonisation initial
conditions, the initial conditions at independence, as well as the post-colonial changes.
Furthermore, our results suggest that openness also matters, alongside education, in ex-
plaining the post colonial income di⁄erences amongst former SSA countries.
This study is also similar to the work of Rostowski & Stacescu (2006) which explores
the empirical relationship between legal and colonial origin on growth. Like Klerman et al
(2008), Rostowski & Stacescu also ￿nd that colonial origin matters more than legal origin
and that education is the likely channel through which colonial origin a⁄ects growth. In
the context of this study, the main problem with the Rostowski & Stacescu paper, as
with the Klerman et al paper, is that they do not probe into the di⁄erent mechanisms
through which colonial origin a⁄ects income and their analyses are limited to the initial
conditions at independence. For instance, Rostowski & Stacescu conclude their paper
with this remark: "examining the channels through which colonial origin could a⁄ect
growth is therefore the ￿rst priority for future research".
The results of this study are also consistent with prior work by Grier (1999) and
Bertocchi & Canova (2002), who ￿nd that former British colonies have better economic
performance than former French colonies. Grier (1999) focuses part of his results on the
African sample and ￿nds that French ex-colonies performed 1.38 percentage points worse
on average than their British counterparts, and this growth di⁄erential is attributable to
di⁄erences in educational policies at independence. Although this result concords with
ours, Grier considers only initial conditions at independence.
In short, this study goes beyond the three previous studies not only by simultaneously
investigating a range of feasible transmission channels between colonial origin and income,
but also in jointly examining the pre-colonisation initial conditions, alongside the initial
conditions at independence and the subsequent post-independence changes.
266 Conclusion
This study sought to investigate whether colonial origin really matters for economic per-
formance in SSA during 1960-2000 and, if it does, what its likely transmission mechanisms
are. The methodology that has been applied in this study is slightly di⁄erent to that of
previous works, where only initial conditions at independence were held to in￿ uence the
subsequent growth path. This study combines both the pre-colonisation initial conditions,
alongside the initial conditions at independence and the subsequent post-independence
changes in explaining income di⁄erences amongst former SSA countries.
The results suggest that former British colonies have had marginally higher income
levels than former French colonies during 1960-2000, and that this is attributable to the
favourable contribution of the legacy of British colonisation in trade openness and human
capital. We do not ￿nd robust evidence in support of the market distortion and selection
bias channels.
The empirical literature has recently emphasised the speci￿c colonial policy of ed-
ucation as the likely transmission mechanism between colonial origin and growth but,
to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous studies have explored systematically
a range of feasible channels simultaneously. Besides highlighting the importance of the
trade openness channel, the study also makes a novel contribution by jointly examining
the income in￿ uences of pre-colonisation initial conditions, the initial conditions at inde-
pendence, and the post-colonisation changes brought about by the independence states
themselves.
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF SSA FORMER COLONIES (38 COUN-
TRIES)
I. Former British SSA Colonies (16 COUNTRIES)
Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
II. Former French SSA Colonies (15 COUNTRIES)
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo Rep, Cote
D￿ Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo.
III. Former Portuguese, Belgian, Italian or Spanish SSA Colonies (7 COUNTRIES)
Angola, Burundi, Congo Dem, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, So-
malia.
APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITION AND SOURCES
27BCORG: Former British Colony dummy variable taking the value of 1 for countries
that acquired their independence fromBritain and 0 otherwise.
FCORG: Former French Colony dummy variable taking the value of 1 for countries that
acquired independence fromFrance and 0 otherwise.
OCORG: Other non-British and non-French former colony dummy taking the value of
1 for countries that acquired independence from any other European power besides Britain
and France, and zero otherwise.
GROW: Annual levels of the natural logarithm of real GDP PPP during 1960-2000
(Africa Research Program datasets)
DUREE: The duration of colonial rule, obtained by subtracting the respective coun-
try independence year from the year of colonisation. Source of colonisation dates is from
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki).
LOGPCGDP60: The natural logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product in
1960 (Penn World Table, Mark 5.6)
GPO: Annual growth rates of population during 1960-2000 (Global Development Fi-
nance & World Development Indicators-GDF&WDI)
ETHNIC: Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa￿ s
Growth Tragedy: Policies & Ethnic Division, 112 Q.J. Econ. 1203 (1997).
SEC: Secondary enrolment rates during 1960-2000. (GDF & WDI)
INV: Annual shares of real investment in GDP PPP, 1960-2000 (Africa Research Pro-
gramdatasets)
BMP: Annual growth rates of the black market exchange rate premium, 1960-2000.
(GDF & WDI)
EXP: Annual levels of export share in GDP during 1960-2000 (GDF&WDI)
OPEN: Annual levels of the combined share of exports and imports in GDP during
1960-2000 (Africa Research Program datasets).
INFL: Annual %changes in consumer prices during 1960-2000 (GDF & WDI)
LIFE: Annual levels of the average life expectancy during 1960-2000 (Africa Research
Programdatasets).
DNRES: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 for natural resource-rich (oil, co-
coa & diamonds) countries, and zero otherwise. Countries included are Gabon, Equatoria
Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Angola, DRC, Nigeria and Botswana.
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33Figure 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics
V ariab le O b s. Me a n St d .   De v . Mi n M ax
Natural  Logarithm   of  G DP  PPP,  1960-2000 880 22.59 1. 07 19.68 25. 31
Re a l p e r C ap ita G D P  in  19 60 (lo g) 1394 7.05 0. 61 5.95 8.09
Black  M arket  Prem i um  at  Independence 1271 51.49 167.18 -0.49 857.41
Openness  at   I ndependence 1435 72.45 64.47 4.48 291.06
Secondary  enr olment  at  Independence 1517 4.74 7. 76 1 43.8
Aver age  School i ng  year s  at   I ndependence 861 1.54 1. 05 0.22 3.92
Expor t /GDP  shar e  at   I ndependence 1435 25.42 18.85 4.86 78. 92
Dummy  Nat ur al   Resour ce  Ri c h  Count r i es 1558 0.26 0. 44 0 1
Population  G row th,  1960-2000 1520 2.59 1. 07 -6.1 11. 03
Eth n o -lin gu istic Fractio n alisa tio n 1394 65.15 24.18 0 93
Inflation Grow th Rate ,  1960-2000 986 36.82 233.14 -13.05 4145.11
Black M arket Prem ium ,  1960-2000 1170 61.01 274.54 -89.16 4806.89
Secondary enrolm ent  rate s, 1960-2000 865 19 16.16 1 93. 12
Openne ss  to  Trade , 1960-2000 1425 76.07 47.28 2.64 440.56
Export  share in G DP, 1960-2000 1341 28.04 17.53 1.94 92. 37
Investm ent share in  G DP,  1960-2000 1490 10.83 9.6 2.81 72. 41
Average  Schooli ng  years,   1960-2000 705 2.02 1. 21 0.22 5.57
Dummy  Landlockedness 1558 0.37 0. 48 0 1
1558 70.26 14.74 55 111
Fren ch Fo rm er
V a ria b le SSA  Col oni es
Natural  Logarithm   of  G DP  PPP,  1960-2000
Re a l pe r ca pita G D P in 1960  (Lo g)
Black  M arket  Prem i um  at  Independence
Openness  at   I ndependence
Secondary  enr olment  at  Independence
Aver age  School i ng  year s  at   I ndependence
Expor t /GDP  shar e  at   I ndependence
Black M arket Prem ium   during  1960-2000
Openne ss  to  Trade , 1960-2000
Export  share in G DP, 1960-2000
Secondary enrolm ent  rate s, 1960-2000
Average  Schooli ng  years,   1960-2000
Dummy  Landlockedness
Du m m y natu ral re sou rces
Investm ent share in  G DP,  1960-2000
Population  G row th,  1960-2000
Eth n o -lin gu istic Fractio n alisa tio n
Inflation Grow th Rate ,  1960-2000
Duration of Colonisation  (in ye ars)
Notes: Asterisks  indicate results of t-tests.  The null hypothesis is  that  the m ean  is the  sam e as  the
mean  for   for m er   Fr ench  SSA  col oni es.
*
 Sign ifican t a t 10 % ;
**
 Sign ificant at 5% ;
***






8.57 13.61*** 9. 53
1.83 3.06*** 1.26**
0.33 0.44* 0. 28
7.07***
15.72 24.57*** 9.9***
66 .1 90.85*** 54.96
26.78 32.21*** 20.39***
SSA  Co lo n ies SS A  C o lo n ies
17.82 75.18*** 155.61***
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34Figure 2: Stage One Results using Pooled OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10Model 11Model 12Model 13Model 14Model 15Model 16Model 17Model 18Model 19Model 20
BCORG 0.178*** 0.071 -0.078 0.110** 0.114** -0.121 0.145*** 0.043 0.045 -0.292*** -0.233** 0.008 -0.087* -0.010 -0.652*** -0.637*** -0.007 0.176*** -0.641*** 0.322**
(0.049) (0.053) (0.092) (0.052) (0.055) (0.113) (0.056) (0.077) (0.049) (0.109) (0.123) (0.039) (0.052) (0.054) (0.061) (0.059) (0.045) (0.049) (0.085) (0.149)
OCORG -0.187*** -0.003 (1) -0.234*** -0.227*** (1) -0.187*** -0.167** -0.198*** -0.281*** 0.053 -0.135*** -0.399*** -0.016 -0.685*** -0.873*** -0.396*** -0.434*** -0.021 0.751***
(0.057) (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.057) (0.088) (0.049) (0.101) (0.109) (0.050) (0.079 (0.054) (0.078) (0.079) (0.043) (0.031) (0.089) (0.133)
BMP60 -0.000*** -0.005 0.014 -0.000** -0.001**





BMP -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
BMP-BRI -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
BMP-OTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
OPEN60 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004***





OPEN 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OPEN-BRI 0.004*** -0.000 0.001 -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
OPEN-OTH 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
SEC60 0.052*** 0.001 -0.009 0.089*** 0.077***





SEC 0.025*** 0.005** 0.004* 0.004 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
SEC-BRI 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.023*** -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SEC-OTH 0.048*** 0.044*** -0.013 -0.023**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
ETHNRES 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
ETRES-BRI -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
















CONSTANT 7.117*** 7.107*** 7.132*** 7.136*** 7.131*** 7.043*** 7.136*** 7.167*** 6.622*** 6.762*** 6.664*** 6.898*** 6.997*** 6.612*** 6.956*** 6.983*** 6.995*** 6.929*** 6.681*** 3.086***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.076) (0.033) (0.036) (0.102) (0.032) (0.034) (0.042) (0.074) (0.069) (0.020) (0.037) (0.030) (0.042) (0.043) (0.021) (0.018) (0.052) (0.279)
No of Obs. 895 755 755 699 699 597 843 843 834 834 828 869 869 699 699 696 806 806 464 355
R-Squared 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.55 0.62 0.18 0.24 0.57 0.88
Standard Errors are presented in parentheses. 1% level of significance, 5% by ** and 10% by *. The omitted category is French Colonial Origin (FCORG).
(1) Variable dropped due to multicollinearity
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP PPP (Log)
35Figure 3: Stage Two Results using HT Estimator
36Figure 4: Robustness Checks using Alternative Proxies for Human Capital & Trade Open-
ness
37